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21 Ott

Background Note: Syria


Official Name: Syrian Arab Republic






Area: 185,170 sq. km. (71,504 sq. mi.), including 1,295 sq. km. of Israeli-occupied territory; about the size of North Dakota.
Cities: Capital–Damascus (1.7 million). Other cities–Metropolitan Damascus (excluding city) (2.7 million), Aleppo (4.6 million), Homs (1.7 million), Hama (1.5 million), Idleb (1.4 million), al-Hasakeh (1.4 million), Dayr al-Zur (1.1 million), Latakia (1 million), Dar’a (1 million), al-Raqqa (900,000), and Tartus (800,000).
Terrain: Narrow coastal plain with a double mountain belt in the west; large, semiarid and desert plateau to the east.
Climate: Mostly desert; hot, dry, sunny summers (June to August) and mild, rainy winters (December to February) along coast.

Nationality: Noun and adjective–Syrian(s).
Population (2009 est.)*: 21 million.
Population growth rate (2009 est.): 2.37%.
Major ethnic groups: Arabs (90%), Kurds (9%), Armenians, Circassians, Turkomans.
Religions: Sunni Muslims (74%), Alawis (12%), Christians (10%), Druze (3%), and small numbers of other Muslim sects, Jews, and Yazidis.
Languages: Arabic (official), Kurdish, Armenian, Aramaic, Circassian widely understood, French, English somewhat understood, principally in major cities.
Education (2008 est.): Years compulsory–primary, 6 yrs. Attendance–97.9%. Literacy–90.8%, illiteracy–9.2%.
Health (2009 est.): Infant mortality rate–17/1,000. Life expectancy–69.8 yrs. male, 72.68 yrs. female.
Work force (5.5 million, 2008 est.): Services (including government) 26%, agriculture 19%, industry 14%, commerce 16%, construction 15%, transportation 7%, and finance 3%.
Unemployment (2008 est.): 9.8%.

Type: Republic, under authoritarian military-dominated Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party regimes since March 1963.
Independence: April 17, 1946.
Constitution: March 13, 1973. Since 1963, Syria has been under Emergency Law, which effectively suspends most constitutional protections.
Branches: Executive–president, two vice presidents, prime minister, Council of Ministers (cabinet). Legislative–unicameral People’s Council. Judicial–Supreme Judicial Council, Supreme Constitutional Court, Court of Cassation, Appeals Courts, Economic Security Courts, Supreme State Security Court, Personal Status and local levels courts.
Administrative subdivisions: 14 provinces
Political parties: The National Progressive Front, an umbrella organization for several parties permitted by the government including the Arab Socialist Renaissance (Ba’ath) Party; Socialist Unionist Democratic Party; Syrian Arab Socialist Union or ASU, Syrian Communist Party (two branches); Syrian Social Nationalist Party; Unionist Socialist Party; and other parties not legally recognized but quasi-tolerated, generally considered opposition-oriented but enfeebled and reluctant to challenge the government. There are also several illegal Kurdish parties.
Suffrage: Universal at 18.

Economy (2010 projected)
GDP*: $59.4 billion.
Real growth rate*: 5.0%.
Per capita GDP*: $2,664.
Natural resources: petroleum, phosphates, iron, chrome and manganese ores, asphalt, rock salt, marble, gypsum, hydropower.
Agriculture: Products–wheat, barley, cotton, lentils, chickpeas, olives, sugar beets, and other fruits and vegetables; beef, mutton, eggs, poultry, and other dairy products. Arable land–33%.
Industry: Types–petroleum, textiles, pharmaceuticals, food processing, beverages, tobacco, phosphate rock mining, cement, oil seed extraction, and car assembly.
Trade: Exports (2008 est.)–$13.6 billion: crude oil, minerals, petroleum products, fruits and vegetables, cotton fiber, textiles, clothing, meat and live animals, wheat. Major markets (2007)–Italy 22%, France 11%, Saudi Arabia 10%, Iraq 5%, Egypt 4%, Jordan 4%. Imports (2008 est.)–$17.2 billion f.o.b.: machinery and transport equipment, electric power machinery, food and livestock, metal and metal products, chemicals and chemical products, plastics, yarn, and paper. Major suppliers (2007)–Russia 10%, China 8%, Saudi Arabia 6%, Ukraine 6%, South Korea 5%, Turkey 4%.

*according to International Monetary Fund (IMF) statistics

Ethnic Syrians are of Semitic stock. Syria’s population is 90% Muslim–74% Sunni, and 16% other Muslim groups, including the Alawi, Shi’a, and Druze–and 10% Christian. There also is a tiny Syrian Jewish community.

Arabic is the official, and most widely spoken, language. Arabs, including some 500,000 Palestinian and up to 1 million Iraqi refugees, make up 90% of the population. Many educated Syrians also speak English or French, but English is the more widely understood. The Kurds, many of whom speak the banned Kurdish language, make up 9% of the population and live mostly in the northeast corner of Syria, though sizable Kurdish communities live in most major Syrian cities as well. Armenian and Turkic are spoken among the small Armenian and Turkoman populations.

Most people live in the Euphrates River valley and along the coastal plain, a fertile strip between the coastal mountains and the desert. Education is free and compulsory from ages 6 to 12. Schooling consists of 6 years of primary education followed by a 3-year preparatory or vocational training period and a 3-year secondary or vocational program. The second 3-year period of secondary schooling is required for university admission. Total enrollment at post-secondary schools is over 150,000. The illiteracy rate of Syrians aged 15 and older is 9.3% for males and 17.8% for females.

Ancient Syria’s cultural and artistic achievements and contributions are many. Archaeologists have discovered extensive writings and evidence of a brilliant culture rivaling those of Mesopotamia and Egypt in and around the ancient city of Ebla. Later Syrian scholars and artists contributed to Hellenistic and Roman thought and culture. Zeno of Sidon founded the Epicurean school; Cicero was a pupil of Antiochus of Ascalon at Athens; and the writings of Posidonius of Apamea influenced Livy and Plutarch. Syrians have contributed to Arabic literature and music and have a proud tradition of oral and written poetry. Although declining, the world-famous handicraft industry still employs thousands.

Archaeologists have demonstrated that Syria was the center of one of the most ancient civilizations on earth. Around the excavated city of Ebla in northern Syria, discovered in 1975, a great Semitic empire spread from the Red Sea north to Turkey and east to Mesopotamia from 2500 to 2400 B.C. The city of Ebla alone during that time had a population estimated at 260,000. Scholars believe the language of Ebla to be the oldest Semitic language.

Syria was occupied successively by Canaanites, Phoenicians, Hebrews, Arameans, Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Nabataeans, Byzantines, and, in part, Crusaders before finally coming under the control of the Ottoman Turks. Syria is significant in the history of Christianity; Paul was converted on the road to Damascus and established the first organized Christian Church at Antioch in ancient Syria, from which he left on many of his missionary journeys.

Damascus, settled about 2500 B.C., is one of the oldest continuously inhabited cities in the world. It came under Muslim rule in A.D. 636. Immediately thereafter, the city’s power and prestige reached its peak, and it became the capital of the Omayyad Empire, which extended from Spain to India from A.D. 661 to A.D. 750, when the Abbasid caliphate was established at Baghdad, Iraq.

Damascus became a provincial capital of the Mameluke Empire around 1260. It was largely destroyed in 1400 by Tamerlane, the Mongol conqueror, who removed many of its craftsmen to Samarkand. Rebuilt, it continued to serve as a capital until 1516. In 1517, it fell under Ottoman rule. The Ottomans remained for the next 400 years, except for a brief occupation by Ibrahim Pasha of Egypt from 1832 to 1840.

French Occupation
In 1920, an independent Arab Kingdom of Syria was established under King Faysal of the Hashemite family, who later became King of Iraq. However, his rule over Syria ended after only a few months, following the clash between his Syrian Arab forces and regular French forces at the battle of Maysalun. French troops occupied Syria later that year after the League of Nations put Syria under French mandate. With the fall of France in 1940, Syria came under the control of the Vichy Government until the British and Free French occupied the country in July 1941. Continuing pressure from Syrian nationalist groups forced the French to evacuate their troops in April 1946, leaving the country in the hands of a republican government that had been formed during the mandate.

Independence to 1970
Although rapid economic development followed the declaration of independence of April 17, 1946, Syrian politics from independence through the late 1960s were marked by upheaval. A series of military coups, begun in 1949, undermined civilian rule and led to army colonel Adib Shishakli’s seizure of power in 1951. After the overthrow of President Shishakli in a 1954 coup, continued political maneuvering supported by competing factions in the military eventually brought Arab nationalist and socialist elements to power.

Syria’s political instability during the years after the 1954 coup, the parallelism of Syrian and Egyptian policies, and the appeal of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s leadership in the wake of the 1956 Suez crisis created support in Syria for union with Egypt. On February 1, 1958, the two countries merged to create the United Arab Republic, and all Syrian political parties ceased overt activities.

The union was not a success, however. Following a military coup on September 28, 1961, Syria seceded, reestablishing itself as the Syrian Arab Republic. Instability characterized the next 18 months, with various coups culminating on March 8, 1963, in the installation by leftist Syrian Army officers of the National Council of the Revolutionary Command (NCRC), a group of military and civilian officials who assumed control of all executive and legislative authority. The takeover was engineered by members of the Arab Socialist Resurrection Party (Ba’ath Party), which had been active in Syria and other Arab countries since the late 1940s. The new cabinet was dominated by Ba’ath members.

The Ba’ath takeover in Syria followed a Ba’ath coup in Iraq the previous month. The new Syrian Government explored the possibility of federation with Egypt and Ba’ath-controlled Iraq. An agreement was concluded in Cairo on April 17, 1963, for a referendum on unity to be held in September 1963. However, serious disagreements among the parties soon developed, and the tripartite federation failed to materialize. Thereafter, the Ba’ath regimes in Syria and Iraq began to work for bilateral unity. These plans foundered in November 1963, when the Ba’ath regime in Iraq was overthrown. In May 1964, President Amin Hafiz of the NCRC promulgated a provisional constitution providing for a National Council of the Revolution (NCR), an appointed legislature composed of representatives of mass organizations–labor, peasant, and professional unions–a presidential council, in which executive power was vested, and a cabinet. On February 23, 1966, a group of army officers carried out a successful, intra-party coup, imprisoned President Hafiz, dissolved the cabinet and the NCR, abrogated the provisional constitution, and designated a regionalist, civilian Ba’ath government. The coup leaders described it as a “rectification” of Ba’ath Party principles. The defeat of the Syrians and Egyptians in the June 1967 war with Israel weakened the radical socialist regime established by the 1966 coup. Conflict developed between a moderate military wing and a more extremist civilian wing of the Ba’ath Party. The 1970 retreat of Syrian forces sent to aid the PLO during the “Black September” hostilities with Jordan reflected this political disagreement within the ruling Ba’ath leadership. On November 13, 1970, Minister of Defense Hafiz al-Asad affected a bloodless military coup, ousting the civilian party leadership and assuming the role of prime minister.

1970 to 2000
Upon assuming power, Hafiz al-Asad moved quickly to create an organizational infrastructure for his government and to consolidate control. The Provisional Regional Command of Asad’s Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party nominated a 173-member legislature, the People’s Council, in which the Ba’ath Party took 87 seats. The remaining seats were divided among “popular organizations” and other minor parties. In March 1971, the party held its regional congress and elected a new 21-member Regional Command headed by Asad. In the same month, a national referendum was held to confirm Asad as President for a 7-year term. In March 1972, to broaden the base of his government, Asad formed the National Progressive Front, a coalition of parties led by the Ba’ath Party, and elections were held to establish local councils in each of Syria’s 14 governorates. In March 1973, a new Syrian constitution went into effect followed shortly thereafter by parliamentary elections for the People’s Council, the first such elections since 1962.

The authoritarian regime was not without its critics, though most were quickly dealt with. A serious challenge arose in the late 1970s, however, from fundamentalist Sunni Muslims, who reject the basic values of the secular Ba’ath program and object to rule by the Alawis, whom they consider heretical. From 1976 until its suppression in 1982, the archconservative Muslim Brotherhood led an armed insurgency against the regime. In response to an attempted uprising by the brotherhood in February 1982, the government crushed the fundamentalist opposition centered in the city of Hama, leveling parts of the city with artillery fire and causing many thousands of dead and wounded. Since then, public manifestations of anti-regime activity have been very limited.

Syria’s 1990 participation in the U.S.-led multinational coalition aligned against Saddam Hussein marked a dramatic watershed in Syria’s relations both with other Arab states and with the West. Syria participated in the multilateral Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid in October 1991. During the 1990s, Syria engaged in direct, face-to-face negotiations with Israel; these negotiations failed.

Hafiz Al-Asad died on June 10, 2000, after 30 years in power. Immediately following Al-Asad’s death, the parliament amended the constitution, reducing the mandatory minimum age of the president from 40 to 34 years old, which allowed his son, Bashar Al-Asad legally to be eligible for nomination by the ruling Ba’ath Party. On July 10, 2000, Bashar Al-Asad was elected President by referendum in which he ran unopposed, garnering 97.29% of the vote, according to Syrian Government statistics. He was inaugurated into office on July 17, 2000 for a 7-year term.

2000 to 2011
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, the Syrian Government began limited cooperation with U.S. counterterrorism efforts. However, Syria opposed the Iraq war in March 2003, and bilateral relations with the United States swiftly deteriorated. In December 2003, President George W. Bush signed into law the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, which provided for the imposition of a series of sanctions against Syria if Syria did not end its support for Palestinian terrorist groups, curtail its military and security interference in Lebanon, cease its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, and meet its obligations under United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq. In May 2004, the President determined that Syria had not met these conditions and implemented sanctions that prohibit the export to Syria of U.S. products except for food and medicine, and the taking off from or landing in the United States of Syrian Government-owned aircraft. At the same time, the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced its intention to order U.S. financial institutions to sever correspondent accounts with the Commercial Bank of Syria based on money-laundering concerns, pursuant to Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act. Acting under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the President also authorized the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to freeze assets belonging to certain Syrian individuals and entities.

Tensions between Syria and the United States intensified from mid-2004 to early 2009, primarily over issues relating to Iraq and Lebanon. The U.S. Government recalled its ambassador to Syria in February 2005, after the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. Prior to the assassination, France and the U.S. in 2004 had co-authored UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1559 calling for “all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon.” Under pressure following the assassination, Syrian troops stationed in Lebanon since 1976 were withdrawn by April 2005. Sensing its international isolation, the Syrians strengthened their relations with Iran and radical Palestinians groups based in Damascus, and cracked down on any signs of internal dissent. However, during the July-August 2006 conflict between Israel and Hizballah, Syria placed its military forces on alert but did not intervene directly on behalf of its ally Hizballah.

On May 27, 2007, President Al-Asad was reaffirmed by referendum for a second 7-year term with 97.6% of the vote. During 2008, though Syria’s relations with the U.S. remained strained, Syria’s international isolation was slowly being overcome as indirect talks between Israel and Syria, mediated by Turkey, were announced and a Qatar-brokered deal in Lebanon was reached. Shortly thereafter, French president Nicolas Sarkozy invited President Asad to participate in the Euro-Mediterranean summit in Paris, spurring a growing stream of diplomatic visits to Damascus. Since January 2009, President Barack Obama’s administration has continued to review Syria policy, and there have been a succession of congressional and U.S. administration officials who have visited Syria while in the region.

Despite high hopes when President Al-Asad first took power in 2000, there has been little movement on political reform, with more public focus on limited economic liberalizations. The Syrian Government provided some cooperation to the UN Independent International Investigation Commission, which investigated the killing of Hariri until superseded by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Since the 34-day conflict in Lebanon in July and August 2006, evidence of Syrian compliance with its obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1701 not to rearm the Lebanese group Hizballah is unpersuasive. On April 17, 2007, the United Nations Security Council welcomed the Secretary General’s intention to evaluate the situation along the entire Syria-Lebanon border and invited the Secretary General to dispatch an independent mission to fully assess the monitoring of the border, and to report back on its findings and recommendations. As of March 2011, the border had yet to be demarcated.

Since 2009, the U.S. has attempted to engage with Syria to find areas of mutual interest, reduce regional tensions, and promote Middle East peace. These efforts have included congressional and executive meetings with senior Syrian officials, including President Asad, and the return of a U.S. Ambassador to Damascus.

The Syrian constitution vests the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party with leadership functions in the state and society and provides broad powers to the president. The president, approved by referendum for a 7-year term, is also Secretary General of the Ba’ath Party and leader of the National Progressive Front, which is a coalition of 10 political parties authorized by the regime. The president has the right to appoint ministers, to declare war and states of emergency, to issue laws (which, except in the case of emergency, require ratification by the People’s Council), to declare amnesty, to amend the constitution, and to appoint civil servants and military personnel. The Emergency Law, which effectively suspends most constitutional protections for Syrians, has been in effect since 1963.

The National Progressive Front also acts as a forum in which economic policies are debated and the country’s political orientation is determined. However, because of Ba’ath Party dominance, the National Progressive Front has traditionally exercised little independent power.

The Syrian constitution of 1973 requires that the president be Muslim but does not make Islam the state religion. Islamic jurisprudence, however, is required to be a main source of legislation. The judicial system in Syria is an amalgam of Ottoman, French, and Islamic laws, with three levels of courts: courts of first instance, courts of appeals, and the constitutional court, the highest tribunal. In addition, religious courts handle questions of personal and family law.

The Ba’ath Party emphasizes socialism and secular Arabism. Although Ba’ath Party doctrine seeks to build pan-Arab rather than ethnic identity, ethnic, religious, and regional allegiances remain important in Syria.

Members of President Asad’s own minority sect, the Alawis, hold most of the important military and security positions, while Sunnis (in 2006) controlled ten of 14 positions on the powerful Ba’ath Party Regional Command. In recent years there has been a gradual decline in the party’s preeminence. The party also is heavily influenced by the security services and the military, the latter of which consumes a large share of Syria’s economic resources.

Syria is divided administratively into 14 provinces, one of which is Damascus. A governor for each province is appointed by the president. The governor is assisted by an elected provincial council.

Principal Government Officials
President–Bashar Al-Asad
Vice President–Farouk al-Shar’a
Vice President–Najah al-Attar
Prime Minister–Muhammad Naji al-Otari
Minister of Foreign Affairs–Walid al-Mouallem
Ambassador to the United States–Imad Moustapha
Ambassador to the United Nations–Bashar al-Ja’fari

Syria maintains an embassy in the United States at 2215 Wyoming Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20008 (tel. 202-232-6313; fax 202-234-9548). Consular section hours are 9:15 a.m.-3:15 p.m., Monday-Friday. Syria also has three honorary consuls: 1022 Wirt Rd., Suite 300, Houston, TX 77055 (tel. 713-622-8860; fax 713-622-8872); 3 San Joaquin Plaza, #190, Newport Beach, CA 92660 (tel. 949-640-9888; fax 949-640-9292); and P.O. Box 2392, Birmingham, MI 48012-2392 (tel. 248-519-2496; fax 248-519-2399).

Officially, Syria is a republic. In reality, however, it is an authoritarian regime that exhibits only the forms of a democratic system. Although citizens ostensibly vote for the president and members of parliament, they do not have the right to change their government. The late President Hafiz Al-Asad was confirmed by unopposed referenda five times. His son, Bashar Al-Asad, also was confirmed by an unopposed referendum in July 2000 and May 2007. The President and his senior aides, particularly those in the military and security services, ultimately make most basic decisions in political and economic life, with a very limited degree of public accountability. Political opposition to the President is not tolerated. Syria has been under a state of emergency since 1963. Syrian governments have justified martial law by the state of war that continues to exist with Israel and by continuing threats posed by terrorist groups.

The Asad regime (little has changed since Bashar Al-Asad succeeded his father) has held power longer than any other Syrian government since independence; its survival is due partly to a strong desire for stability and the regime’s success in giving groups such as religious minorities and peasant farmers a stake in society. The expansion of the government bureaucracy has also created a large class loyal to the regime. The President’s continuing strength is due also to the army’s continued loyalty and the effectiveness of Syria’s large internal security apparatus. The leadership of both is comprised largely of members of Asad’s own Alawi sect. The several main branches of the security services operate independently of each other and outside of the legal system. Each continues to be responsible for human rights violations.

All three branches of government are guided by the views of the Ba’ath Party, whose primacy in state institutions is assured by the constitution. The Ba’ath platform is proclaimed succinctly in the party’s slogan: “Unity, freedom, and socialism.” The party has traditionally been considered both socialist, advocating state ownership of the means of industrial production and the redistribution of agricultural land, and revolutionary, dedicated to carrying a socialist revolution to every part of the Arab world. Founded by Michel ‘Aflaq, a Syrian Christian and Salah al-Din Al-Bitar, a Syrian Sunni, the Ba’ath Party embraces secularism and has attracted supporters of all faiths in many Arab countries, especially Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon. Since August 1990, however, the party has tended to de-emphasize socialism and to stress both pan-Arab unity and the need for gradual reform of the Syrian economy.

Nine smaller political parties are permitted to exist and, along with the Ba’ath Party, make up the National Progressive Front (NPF), a grouping of parties that represents the sole framework of legal political party participation for citizens. Created to give the appearance of a multi-party system, the NPF is dominated by the Ba’ath Party and does not change the essentially one-party character of the political system. Non-Ba’ath parties included in the NPF represent small political groupings of a few hundred members each and conform strictly to Ba’ath Party and government policies. There were reports in 2005, in the wake of the June Ba’ath Party Congress, that the government was considering legislation to permit the formation of new political parties and the legalization of parties previously banned. These changes have not taken place. In addition, some 15 small independent parties outside the NPF operate without government sanction.

The Ba’ath Party dominates the parliament, which is known as the People’s Council. With members elected every 4 years, the Council has no independent authority. The executive branch retains ultimate control over the legislative process, although parliamentarians may criticize policies and modify draft laws; according to the constitution and its bylaws, a group of 10 parliamentarians can propose legislation. During 2001, two independent members of parliament, Ma’mun al-Humsy and Riad Seif, who had advocated political reforms, were stripped of their parliamentary immunity and tried and convicted of charges of “attempting to illegally change the constitution.” Seif was released from prison in early 2006, but was detained and sentenced to prison again in January 2008.

The government has allowed independent non-NPF candidates to run for a limited allotment of seats in the 250-member People’s Council. Following the April 22-23, 2007 parliamentary elections, the NPF strengthened its hold on parliament, with the number of non-NPF deputies shrinking from 83 to 80, ensuring a permanent absolute majority for the Ba’ath Party-dominated NPF.

There was a surge of interest in political reform after Bashar al-Asad assumed power in 2000. Human rights activists and other civil society advocates, as well as some parliamentarians, became more outspoken during a period referred to as “Damascus Spring” (July 2000-February 2001). Asad also made a series of appointments of reform-minded advisors to formal and less formal positions, and included a number of similarly oriented individuals in his cabinet. The 2001 arrest and long-term detention of the two reformist parliamentarians and the apparent marginalizing of some of the reformist advisors in the past 10 years, indicate that the pace of any political reform in Syria is likely to be much slower than the short-lived Damascus Spring promised. A crackdown on civil society in 2005, in the wake of Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon, and again in the late winter and spring of 2006, coupled with the early-2011 mobilization of security forces to prevent protests and demonstrations have reinforced the perception that any steps toward political reform were likely to be halting and piecemeal at best.

In October 2008, 12 members of the Damascus Declaration National Council were sentenced to 2-1/2 years in prison. The Damascus Declaration is a civil society reform document written in 2005 and signed by a confederation of opposition parties and individual activists who seek to work with the government to ensure greater civil liberties and democratic political reform. The government has shown no hesitation in suppressing those who advocate for human, legal, or minority rights.

Although Internet access is increasing and non-political private media is slowly being introduced, the government continues to ban numerous newspaper and news journal publications from circulating in the country, including Al-Hayat and Al-Sharq Al-Auwsat (both Saudi owned). It has recently allowed access to previously blocked websites, including,, and, but since many computer users in Syria had already learned to circumvent these restrictions, the move is largely cosmetic.

Syria is a middle-income, developing country with an economy based on agriculture, oil, industry, and tourism. However, Syria’s economy faces serious challenges and impediments to growth, including: a large and poorly performing public sector; declining rates of oil production; widening non-oil deficit; widescale corruption; weak financial and capital markets; and high rates of unemployment tied to a high population growth rate. In addition, Syria currently is subject to U.S. economic sanctions under the Syria Accountability Act, which prohibits or restricts the export and re-export of most U.S. products to Syria.

As a result of an inefficient and corrupt centrally planned economy, Syria has low rates of investment, and low levels of industrial and agricultural productivity. The IMF projected real GDP growth at 3.9% in 2009 from close to 6% in 2008. The two main pillars of the Syrian economy used to be agriculture and oil, which together accounted for about one-half of GDP. Agriculture, for instance, accounted for about 25% of GDP and employed 25% of the total labor force. However, poor climatic conditions and severe drought badly affected the agricultural sector, thus reducing its share in the economy to about 17% of 2008 GDP, down from 20.4% in 2007, according to preliminary data from the Central Bureau of Statistics. On the other hand, higher crude oil prices countered declining oil production and led to higher budgetary and export receipts.

Water and energy are among the most pervasive issues facing the agriculture sector. Another difficulty the agricultural sector suffered from is the government’s decision to liberalize the prices of fertilizers, which have increased between 100% and 400%. Drought was an alarming problem in 2008; however, the drought situation slightly improved in 2009. Wheat and barley production about doubled in 2009 compared to 2008. In spite of that, the livelihoods of up to 1 million agricultural workers have been threatened. In response, the UN launched an emergency appeal for $20.2 million. Wheat has been one of the crops most affected, and for the first time in 2 decades Syria has moved from being a net exporter of wheat to a net importer.

Damascus has implemented modest economic reforms in the past few years, including cutting lending interest rates; opening private banks; consolidating all of the multiple exchange rates; raising prices on some subsidized items, most notably diesel, other oil derivatives, and fertilizers; and establishing the Damascus Stock Exchange, which began operations in 2009. In May 2008, Damascus raised the price of subsidized diesel by 357%, and in January 2009 the price of fuel oil was raised by 50%. In addition, President Asad signed legislative decrees to encourage corporate ownership reform and allowed the Central Bank to issue Treasury bills and bonds for government debt. Despite these reforms, the economy remains highly controlled by the government. Long-run economic constraints include declining oil production, high unemployment and inflation rates, rising budget deficits, increasing pressure on water supplies caused by heavy use in agriculture, increasing demand for electricity, rapid population growth, industrial expansion, and water pollution.

The government hopes to attract new investment in the tourism, natural gas, and service sectors to diversify its economy and reduce its dependence on oil and agriculture. The government has begun to institute economic reforms aimed at liberalizing most markets, but reform thus far has been slow and ad hoc. For ideological reasons, privatization of government enterprises is still not widespread, but is in its initial stage for port operations, power generation, and air transport. Most sectors are open for private investment except for cotton mills, land telecommunications, and bottled water.

The Bashar al-Asad government started its reform efforts by changing the regulatory environment in the financial sector, including the introduction of private banks and the opening of a stock exchange in March 2009. In 2001, Syria legalized private banking and the sector, while still nascent, has been growing. As of January 2010, 13 private banks had opened, including two Islamic banks. Syria has taken gradual steps to loosen controls over foreign exchange. In 2003, the government canceled a law that criminalized private sector use of foreign currencies, and in 2005 it issued legislation that allowed licensed private banks to sell specific amounts of foreign currency to Syrian citizens under certain circumstances and to the private sector to finance imports. In October 2009, the Syrian Government further loosened its restrictions on foreign currency transfers by allowing Syrians travelling abroad to withdraw the equivalent of up to U.S. $10,000 from their Syrian Pound accounts. In practice, the decision allows local banks to open accounts of a maximum of U.S. $10,000 that their clients can use for their international payment cards. The holders of these accounts will be able to withdraw up to U.S. $10,000 per month while travelling abroad.

To attract investment and to ease access to credit, the government allowed investors in 2007 to receive loans and other credit instruments from foreign banks, and to repay the loans and any accrued interest through local banks using project proceeds. In February 2008, the government permitted investors to receive loans in foreign currencies from local private banks to finance capital investment. Syria’s exchange rate is fixed, and the government maintains two official rates–one rate on which the budget and the value of imports, customs, and other official transactions are based, and a second set by the Central Bank on a daily basis that covers all other financial transactions. The government passed a law in 2006 which permits the operation of private money exchange companies. However, a small black market for foreign currency is still active.

Given the policies adopted from the 1960s through the late 1980s, which included nationalization of companies and private assets, Syria failed to join an increasingly interconnected global economy. Syria withdrew from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1951 because of Israel’s accession. It is not a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), although it submitted a request to begin the accession process in 2001 and again in 2004. Syria is developing regional free trade agreements. As of January 1, 2005, the Greater Arab Free Trade Agreement (GAFTA) came into effect and customs duties were eliminated between Syria and all other members of GAFTA. Syria’s free trade agreement with Turkey came into force in January 2007. Syria is a signatory to free trade agreements with Jordan, India, Belarus, and Slovakia. In 2004 Syria and the European Union initialed an Association Agreement; the ratification process had not been finalized as of March 2011. Although Syria claims a recent boom in non-oil exports, its trade numbers are notoriously inaccurate and out-of-date. Syria’s main exports include crude oil, refined products, rock phosphate, raw cotton, clothing, fruits and vegetables, and spices. The bulk of Syrian imports are raw materials essential for industry, petroleum products, vehicles, agricultural equipment, and heavy machinery. Earnings from oil exports as well as remittances from Syrian workers are the government’s most important sources of foreign exchange.

Syria has produced heavy-grade oil from fields located in the northeast since the late 1960s. In the early 1980s, light-grade, low-sulphur oil was discovered near Dayr al-Zur in eastern Syria. Syria’s rate of oil production has been decreasing steadily, from a peak close to 610,000 barrels per day (bpd) in 1995 down to approximately 379,000 bpd in 2008. In parallel, Syria’s oil reserves are being gradually depleted and reached 2.5 billion barrels in January 2009. Recent developments have helped revitalize the energy sector, including new discoveries and the successful development of its hydrocarbon reserves. According to the 2009 Syria Report of the Oxford Business Group, the oil sector accounted for 23% of government revenues, 20% of exports, and 22% of GDP in 2008. Experts generally agree that Syria will become a net importer of petroleum by the end of the next decade. Syria exported roughly 150,000 bpd in 2008, and oil still accounts for a majority of the country’s export income. Syria also produces about 22 million cubic meters of gas per day, with estimated reserves around 240 billion cubic meters or 8.5 trillion cubic feet. While the government has begun to work with international energy companies in the hopes of eventually becoming a gas exporter, all gas currently produced is consumed domestically. Demand for electricity is growing at a rate of about 10% per year and is barely met by current generation capacity, and ongoing and planned projects are not expected to be sufficient to meet future demand.

Some basic commodities, such as bread, continue to be heavily subsidized, and social services are provided for nominal charges. The subsidies are becoming harder to sustain as the gap between consumption and production continues to increase. Syria has a population of approximately 21 million people, and Syrian Government figures place the population growth rate at 2.37%, with 65% of the population under the age of 35 and more than 40% under the age of 15. Approximately 200,000 people enter the labor market every year. According to Syrian Government statistics, the unemployment rate in 2009 was 12.6%; however, more accurate independent sources placed it closer to 20%. Government and public sector employees constitute about 30% of the total labor force and are paid very low salaries and wages. Government officials acknowledge that the economy is not growing at a pace sufficient to create enough new jobs annually to match population growth. The UN Development Program announced in 2005 that 30% of the Syrian population lives in poverty and 11.4% live below the subsistence level.

Syria has made progress in easing its heavy foreign debt burden through bilateral rescheduling deals with its key creditors in Europe, most importantly Russia, Germany, and France. Syria has also settled its debt with Iran and the World Bank. In December 2004, Syria and Poland reached an agreement by which Syria would pay $27 million out of the total $261.7 million debt. In January 2005, Russia forgave 73% of Syria’s $14.5 billion long-outstanding debt and in June 2008, Russia’s parliament ratified the agreement. In 2007, Syria and Romania reached an agreement by which Syria will pay 35% of the $118.1 million debt. In May 2008, Syria settled all the debt it owed to the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

President Bashar Al-Asad is commander in chief of the Syrian armed forces, comprised of some 400,000 troops upon mobilization. The military is a conscripted force; males serve 18 months in the military upon reaching the age of 18, though exemptions do exist. Some 17,000 Syrian soldiers formerly deployed in Lebanon were withdrawn to Syria in 2005 in accordance with UNSCR 1559.

Syria’s military remains one of the largest in the region, although the breakup of the Soviet Union–long the principal source of training, material, and credit for the Syrian forces–slowed Syria’s ability to acquire modern military equipment. Syria received significant financial aid from Gulf Arab states in the 1990s as a result of its participation in the first Gulf War, with a sizable portion of these funds earmarked for military spending. Besides sustaining its conventional forces, Syria seeks to develop its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability, including chemical munitions and delivery systems.

In September 2007 Israeli warplanes attacked a purported nuclear facility in Syria. Investigation by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) discovered particles of enriched uranium at the site, with a low probability they were introduced by the missiles used to attack the facility. As of March 2011, the IAEA continued to investigate the issue with only limited cooperation from the Syrian Government.

Ensuring regime survival, increasing influence among its Arab neighbors, and achieving a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace settlement, which includes the return of the Golan Heights, are the primary goals of President Asad’s foreign policy.

Relations with Other Arab Countries
Syria reestablished full diplomatic relations with Egypt in 1989. In the 1990-91 Gulf War, Syria joined other Arab states in the U.S.-led multinational coalition against Iraq. In 1998, Syria began a slow rapprochement with Iraq, driven primarily by economic needs. Syria continues to play an active pan-Arab role and has emerged from its relative isolation following the Hariri assassination, to assert its influence regionally and expand diplomatic relations with Europe, Latin America, and China.

Though it voted in favor of UNSCR 1441 in 2002, Syria was against coalition military action in Iraq in 2003. However, the Syrian Government accepted UNSCR 1483 (after being absent for the actual vote), which lifted sanctions on Iraq and established a framework to assist the Iraqi people in determining their political future and rebuilding their economy. Syria also voted for UNSCR 1511, which called for greater international involvement in Iraq and addressed the transfer of sovereignty from the U.S.-led coalition. Since the transfer of sovereignty in Iraq on June 28, 2004, Syria extended qualified support to the Iraqi Government and pledged to cooperate in the areas of border security, repatriation of Iraqi assets, and eventual restoration of formal diplomatic relations. While Syria has taken some steps to tighten controls along the Syria-Iraq border, Syria remains one of the primary transit points for foreign fighters entering Iraq. Consequently, relations between Syria and the Iraqi Government remained strained. Following a series of visits between high-level officials from both governments–including Foreign Minister Mu’allim’s November 2006 visit to Baghdad and Iraqi President Talabani’s subsequent visit to Damascus–formal diplomatic relations were established in December 2006. That same month, the Ministers of Interior from both countries signed a Memorandum of Security Understanding aimed at improving border security and combating terrorism and crime. However, both nations withdrew their ambassadors following August 2009 bombings in Baghdad. While Iraq continues to call for more action on the part of Syria to control its border and to prevent Iraqi and Arab elements residing in–or transiting–Syria from contributing financially, politically, or militarily to the insurgency in Iraq, relations have improved. Both countries returned their ambassadors in 2010.

Up to an estimated 1 million Iraqi refugees live in Syria since the 2003 U.S.-led intervention in Iraq, of which more than 224,000 have officially registered with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. The U.S. remains the largest single contributor to UN and non-governmental organization (NGO) efforts to assist Iraqi refugees in the region. Total U.S. support region-wide in 2008 approached $400 million–up from $171 million in 2007. By the end of September 2008, 13,823 Iraqi refugees had arrived for resettlement in the United States, surpassing the target of 12,000. This figure represents a more than eightfold increase over the 1,608 Iraqis admitted in the previous year. Most of the Iraqis who arrived in the U.S.–over 9,000–came from Jordan and Syria, the two countries hosting the most Iraqi refugees. Smaller groups came from Turkey, Lebanon, and Egypt. The U.S. remains committed to assisting Iraqi refugees and plans to continue to help meet the needs of Iraq’s displaced population. Between October 2008 and September 2009 the U.S. pledged to admit a minimum of 17,000 of the most vulnerable Iraqis for resettlement in the U.S. through the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program.

Involvement in Lebanon
Syria has played an important role in Lebanon by virtue of its history, size, power, and economy. Lebanon was part of post-Ottoman Syria until 1926. The presence of Syrian troops in Lebanon dated to 1976, when President Hafiz al-Asad intervened in the Lebanese civil war on behalf of Maronite Christians. Following the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Syrian and Israeli forces clashed in eastern Lebanon. However, Syrian opposition blocked implementation of the May 17, 1983, Lebanese-Israeli accord on the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon.

In 1989, Syria endorsed the Charter of National Reconciliation, or “Taif Accord,” a comprehensive plan for ending the Lebanese conflict negotiated under the auspices of Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Morocco. In May 1991, Lebanon and Syria signed the treaty of brotherhood, cooperation, and coordination called for in the Taif Accord.

According to the U.S. interpretation of the Taif Accord, Syria and Lebanon were to have decided on the redeployment of Syrian forces from Beirut and other coastal areas of Lebanon by September 1992. Israeli occupation of Lebanon until May 2000, the breakdown of peace negotiations between Syria and Israel that same year, and intensifying Arab/Israeli tensions since the start of the second Palestinian uprising in September 2000 helped delay full implementation of the Taif Accords. The United Nations declared that Israel’s May 2000 withdrawal from southern Lebanon fulfilled the requirements of UN Security Council Resolution 425. However, Syria and Lebanon claimed that UNSCR 425 had not been fully implemented because Israel did not withdraw from an area of the Golan Heights called Sheba Farms, which had been occupied by Israel in 1967, and which Syria now claimed was part of Lebanon. The United Nations does not recognize this claim. However, Hizballah uses it to justify attacks against Israeli forces in that region. The danger of Hizballah’s tactics was highlighted when Hizballah’s abduction of two Israeli soldiers on July 12, 2006 sparked a 34-day conflict in Lebanon. After the conflict, the passing of UNSCR 1701 authorized the enhancement of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Before the conflict, UNIFIL authorized a presence of 2,000 troops in southern Lebanon; post-conflict, this ceiling was raised to 15,000. UNIFIL is tasked with ensuring peace and security along the frontier and overseeing the return of effective Lebanese government and military authority throughout the border region.

Until its withdrawal in April 2005, Syria maintained approximately 17,000 troops in Lebanon. A September 2004 vote by Lebanon’s Chamber of Deputies to amend the constitution to extend Lebanese President Lahoud’s term in office by 3 years amplified the question of Lebanese sovereignty and the continuing Syrian presence. The vote was clearly taken under Syrian pressure, exercised in part through Syria’s military intelligence service, whose chief in Lebanon had acted as a virtual proconsul for many years. The UN Security Council expressed its concern over the situation by passing Resolution 1559, which called for the withdrawal of all remaining foreign forces from Lebanon, disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias in accordance with the Taif Accord, the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces throughout the country, and a free and fair electoral process in the presidential election.

Former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 19 others were assassinated in Beirut by a car bomb on February 14, 2005. The assassination spurred massive protests in Beirut and international pressure that led to the withdrawal of the remaining Syrian military troops from Lebanon on April 26, 2005. Rafiq Hariri’s assassination was just one of a number of attacks that targeted high-profile Lebanese critics of Syria. The UN International Independent Investigative Commission (UNIIIC) investigated Hariri’s assassination until the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) was established by the UN Security Council. The STL began operating in March 2009, continuing UNIIIC’s work with an aim toward prosecuting the individuals suspected of being behind the attacks.

Syrian-Lebanese relations have improved since 2008 when, in response to French and Saudi engagement with Syria, Damascus recognized Lebanon’s sovereignty and the two countries agreed to exchange ambassadors. Syria sent Ali Abdul Karim Ali to Beirut as its ambassador to Lebanon in May 2009. Following his election in November 2009, Prime Minister Saad Hariri, son of the slain leader, traveled to Damascus for discussions with President Asad. During the visit, the two countries agreed to demarcate their border for the first time. As of March 2011, the border had yet to be demarcated.

Syrian relations with Prime Minister Saad Hariri became strained due to his support for the STL and Syria’s continued support of Hizballah. Hizballah and its parliamentary allies engineered the fall of the Hariri government on January 12, 2011 when they resigned from the cabinet en masse, triggering a constitutional crisis. The new Prime Minister-designate, Najib Mikati, has strong connections to the Syrian regime.

The United States supports a sovereign, independent Lebanon, free of all foreign forces, and believes that the best interests of both Lebanon and Syria are served by a positive and constructive relationship based upon principles of mutual respect and non-intervention between two neighboring sovereign and independent states. The United States calls for Syrian non-interference in Lebanon, consistent with UNSCR 1559 and 1701.

Arab-Israeli Relations
Syria was an active belligerent in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, which resulted in Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights and the city of Quneitra. Following the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, which left Israel in occupation of additional Syrian territory, Syria accepted UN Security Council Resolution 338, which signaled an implicit acceptance of Resolution 242. Resolution 242, which became the basis for the peace process negotiations begun in Madrid in 1981, calls for a just and lasting Middle East peace to include withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in 1967; termination of the state of belligerency; and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of all regional states and of their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.

As a result of the mediation efforts of then U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Syria and Israel concluded a disengagement agreement in May 1974, enabling Syria to recover territory lost in the October war and part of the Golan Heights occupied by Israel since 1967, including Quneitra. The two sides have effectively implemented the agreement, which is monitored by UN forces.

In December 1981, the Israeli Knesset voted to extend Israeli law to the part of the Golan Heights over which Israel retained control. The UN Security Council subsequently passed a resolution calling on Israel to rescind this measure. Syria participated in the Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid in October 1991. Negotiations were conducted intermittently through the 1990s, and came very close to succeeding. However, the parties were unable to come to an agreement over Syria’s nonnegotiable demand that Israel withdraw to the positions it held on June 4, 1967. The peace process collapsed following the outbreak of the second Palestinian (Intifada) uprising in September 2000, though Syria continues to call for a comprehensive settlement based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and the land-for-peace formula adopted at the 1991 Madrid conference.

Tensions between Israel and Syria increased as the second Intifada dragged on, primarily as a result of Syria’s unwillingness to stop giving sanctuary to Palestinian terrorist groups conducting operations against Israel. In October 2003, following a suicide bombing carried out by a member of Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Haifa that killed 20 Israeli citizens, Israeli Defense Forces attacked a suspected Palestinian terrorist training camp 15 kilometers north of Damascus. This was the first such Israeli attack deep inside Syrian territory since the 1973 war. During the summer of 2006 tensions again heightened due to Israeli fighter jets buzzing President Asad’s summer castle in response to Syria’s support for the Palestinian group Hamas, Syria’s support of Hizballah during the July-August 2006 conflict in Lebanon, and the rearming of Hizballah in violation of UN Resolution 1701. Rumors of negotiations between the Israeli and Syrian Governments were initially discounted by both Israel and Syria, with spokespersons for both countries indicating that any such talks were not officially sanctioned. However, the rumors were confirmed in early 2008 when it was announced that indirect talks facilitated by Turkey were taking place. The talks continued until December 2008 when Syria withdrew in response to Israel’s shelling of the Gaza Strip.

Membership in International Organizations
Syria is a member of the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, Arab Common Market, Arab League, Arab Monetary Fund, Council of Arab Economic Unity, Customs Cooperation Council, Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, Food and Agricultural Organization, Group of 24, Group of 77, International Atomic Energy Agency, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Civil Aviation Organization, International Chamber of Commerce, International Development Association, Islamic Development Bank, International Fund for Agricultural Development, International Finance Corporation, International Labor Organization, International Monetary Fund, International Maritime Organization, INTERPOL, International Olympic Committee, International Organization for Standardization, International Telecommunication Union, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Non-Aligned Movement, Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, Organization of the Islamic Conference, United Nations, UN Conference on Trade and Development, UN Industrial Development Organization, UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, Universal Postal Union, World Federation of Trade Unions, World Health Organization, World Meteorological Organization, and World Tourism Organization.

Syria’s 2-year term as a nonpermanent member of the UN Security Council ended in December 2003.

U.S.-Syrian relations, severed in 1967, were resumed in June 1974, following the achievement of the Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement. In 1990-91, Syria cooperated with the United States as a member of the multinational coalition of forces in the Gulf War. The U.S. and Syria also consulted closely on the Taif Accord ending the civil war in Lebanon. In 1991, President Asad made a historic decision to accept President George H.W. Bush’s invitation to attend a Middle East peace conference and to engage in subsequent bilateral negotiations with Israel. Syria’s efforts to secure the release of Western hostages held in Lebanon and its lifting of restrictions on travel by Syrian Jews helped to further improve relations between Syria and the United States. There were several presidential summits; the last one occurred when President Bill Clinton met the late President Hafiz al-Asad in Geneva in March 2000. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, the Syrian Government began limited cooperation with U.S. counterterrorism efforts.

Syria has been on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism since the list’s inception in 1979. Because of its continuing support and safe haven for terrorist organizations, Syria is subject to legislatively mandated penalties, including export sanctions and ineligibility to receive most forms of U.S. aid or to purchase U.S. military equipment. In 1986, the U.S. withdrew its ambassador and imposed additional administrative sanctions on Syria in response to evidence of direct Syrian involvement in an attempt to blow up an Israeli airplane. A U.S. ambassador returned to Damascus in 1987, partially in response to positive Syrian actions against terrorism such as expelling the Abu Nidal Organization from Syria and helping free an American hostage earlier that year.

Relations cooled as a consequence of U.S. intervention in Iraq in 2003, declined following the imposition of U.S. economic sanctions in May 2004, and worsened further in February 2005 after the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri. Issues of U.S. concern include the Syrian Government’s failure to prevent Syria from becoming a major transit point for foreign fighters entering Iraq, its refusal to deport from Syria former Saddam regime elements who are supporting the insurgency in Iraq, its ongoing interference in Lebanese affairs, its protection of the leadership of Palestinian rejectionist groups in Damascus, its deplorable human rights record, and its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. In May 2004, the U.S. Government, pursuant to the provisions of the Syrian Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act, imposed sanctions on Syria which banned nearly all exports to Syria except food and medicine. In February 2005, in the wake of the Hariri assassination, the U.S. recalled its ambassador to Washington.

On September 12, 2006 the U.S. Embassy was attacked by four armed assailants with guns, grenades, and a car bomb (which failed to detonate). Syrian security forces successfully countered the attack, killing all four attackers. Two other Syrians killed during the attack were a government security guard and a passerby. The Syrian Government publicly stated that terrorists had carried out the attack. The U.S. Government has not received an official Syrian Government assessment of the motives or organization behind the attack, but security was upgraded at U.S. facilities. Both the Syrian ambassador to the U.S., Imad Mushtapha, and President Bashar Asad, however, blamed U.S. foreign policy in the region for contributing to the incident.

After a military action occurred at the Iraq-Syria border in October 2008, in which purportedly there were several Syrian casualties, the Syrian Government ordered the closure of Damascus Community, the American Language Center (ALC), and the American Cultural Center (ACC).

Since 2009, the U.S. has attempted to engage with Syria to find areas of mutual interest, reduce regional tensions, and promote Middle East peace. These efforts have included congressional and executive meetings with senior Syrian officials, including President Asad, and the return of a U.S. Ambassador to Damascus.

Principal U.S. Officials
Ambassador–Robert Stephen Ford
Deputy Chief of Mission–Charles Hunter
Head of the Political Section–Amy Tachco
Head of the Economic Section–Joanne Cummings
Consul General–Andre Goodfriend
Management Counselor–Natalie Cropper
Public Affairs Officer–Angela Williams
Defense Attache–Robert Friedenberg

The U.S. Embassy is located at Abu Roumaneh, Al-Mansur St. No. 2; P.O. Box 29; tel. (963)(11) 3391-4444, 3391-3333 (after hours); Public Affairs Section tel: 3391-4162; fax (963)(11) 3391-3999. More information about embassy hours of operation, and consular and American citizen services can be obtained at the embassy’s website:

Travel Alerts, Travel Warnings, Trip Registration
The U.S. Department of State’s Consular Information Program advises Americans traveling and residing abroad through Country Specific Information, Travel Alerts, and Travel Warnings. Country Specific Information exists for all countries and includes information on entry and exit requirements, currency regulations, health conditions, safety and security, crime, political disturbances, and the addresses of the U.S. embassies and consulates abroad. Travel Alerts are issued to disseminate information quickly about terrorist threats and other relatively short-term conditions overseas that pose significant risks to the security of American travelers. Travel Warnings are issued when the State Department recommends that Americans avoid travel to a certain country because the situation is dangerous or unstable.

For the latest security information, Americans living and traveling abroad should regularly monitor the Department’s Bureau of Consular Affairs Internet web site at, where current Worldwide Caution, Travel Alerts, and Travel Warnings can be found. The website also includes information about passports, tips for planning a safe trip abroad and more.  More travel-related information also is available at

Date: 07/01/2011 Description: QR code for Smart Traveler IPhone App. - State Dept ImageThe Department’s Smart Traveler app for U.S. travelers going abroad provides easy access to the frequently updated official country information, travel alerts, travel warnings, maps, U.S. embassy locations, and more that appear on the site. Travelers can also set up e-tineraries to keep track of arrival and departure dates and make notes about upcoming trips. The app is compatible with iPhone, iPod touch, and iPad (requires iOS 4.0 or later).

The Department of State encourages all U.S. citizens traveling or residing abroad to register via the State Department’s travel registration website or at the nearest U.S. embassy or consulate abroad (a link to the registration page is also available through the Smart Traveler app). Registration will make your presence and whereabouts known in case it is necessary to contact you in an emergency and will enable you to receive up-to-date information on security conditions.

Emergency information concerning Americans traveling abroad may be obtained by calling 1-888-407-4747 toll free in the U.S. and Canada or the regular toll line 1-202-501-4444 for callers outside the U.S. and Canada.

The National Passport Information Center (NPIC) is the U.S. Department of State’s single, centralized public contact center for U.S. passport information. Telephone: 1-877-4-USA-PPT (1-877-487-2778); TDD/TTY: 1-888-874-7793. Passport information is available 24 hours, 7 days a week. You may speak with a representative Monday-Friday, 8 a.m. to 10 p.m., Eastern Time, excluding federal holidays.

Health Information
Travelers can check the latest health information with the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, Georgia. A hotline at 800-CDC-INFO (800-232-4636) and a web site at give the most recent health advisories, immunization recommendations or requirements, and advice on food and drinking water safety for regions and countries. The CDC publication “Health Information for International Travel” can be found at

More Electronic Information
Department of State Web Site. Available on the Internet at, the Department of State web site provides timely, global access to official U.S. foreign policy information, including more Background Notes, the Department’s daily press briefings along with the directory of key officers of Foreign Service posts and more. The Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) provides security information and regional news that impact U.S. companies working abroad through its website provides a portal to all export-related assistance and market information offered by the federal government and provides trade leads, free export counseling, help with the export process, and more.


( Fonte: )



21 Ott


Lo sport può essere privato, come la preghiera che la persona recita da sola e per proprio conto, anche dentro una stanza chiusa; oppure può essere pubblico, quale è praticato collettivamente nei campi sportivi, come la preghiera cui si adempie collettivamente nei luoghi di culto. Il primo tipo di sport interessa personalmente il singolo individuo; il secondo riguarda tutto il popolo, il quale lo pratica senza lasciare che nessuno lo faccia in sua vece. Sarebbe irrazionale che le masse (gamàhìr) entrassero nei luoghi di culto, senza pregare, solo per stare a guardare una persona o un gruppo che prega. Allo stesso modo è irrazionale che esse entrino negli stadi e nei campi senza praticare lo sport, solo per stare a guardare uno o più individui che giocano. Lo sport è come il pregare, il mangiare, il riscaldare ed il ventilare. Sarebbe sciocco che le masse entrassero in un ristorante per stare a guardare una persona o un gruppo che mangia! Oppure che la gente lasciasse che una persona o un gruppo godessero fisicamente del riscaldamento e dell’aria in sua vece! Allo stesso modo è irrazionale che si permetta ad un individuo o ad una squadra di monopolizzare lo sport escludendo la società, mentre essa sopporta gli oneri di tale monopolizzazione a vantaggio di detto individuo o detta squadra. Proprio come democraticamente non dovrebbe essere permesso che il popolo autorizzi un individuo, un gruppo, fosse pure un partito, una classe, una confessione religiosa, una tribù o un’assemblea, a decidere del suo destino in sua vece o a sentire i suoi bisogni in sua vece. Lo sport privato interessa solo chi lo pratica su sua responsabilità e a sue spese. Lo sport pubblico è una necessità pubblica per la gente. Nessuno dovrebbe essere delegato a praticarlo in sua vece, fisicamente e democraticamente. Sotto l’aspetto fisico tale delegato non può trasmettere agli altri il vantaggio che trae dallo sport per il suo corpo e il suo spirito. Sotto l’aspetto democratico non è giusto che un individuo o un gruppo monopolizzino lo sport, come anche il potere, la ricchezza e le armi, escludendo gli altri. I circoli sportivi oggi al mondo sono alla base dello sport tradizionale e si accaparrano tutte le spese ed i mezzi pubblici relativi all’attività sportiva in ogni stato. Tali istruzioni non sono altro che strumenti di monopolio sociale; come gli strumenti politici dittatoriali che monopolizzano il potere escludendo le masse; come gli strumenti economici che monopolizzano la ricchezza della società; come gli strumenti militari tradizionali che monopolizzano le armi della società. L’era delle masse, come distruggerà gli strumenti di monopolio della ricchezza, del potere e delle armi, così sicuramente distruggerà anche gli strumenti di monopolio dell’attività sociale quale lo sport, l’equitazione etc. Le masse fanno la fila per sostenere un candidato a rappresentarle nel decidere il loro destino, in base all’assurdo presupposto che egli le rappresenterà e propugnerà la loro dignità, sovranità e prestigio. A tali masse, defraudate della volontà e della dignità, non rimane che stare a guardare una persona che svolge un’attività che per natura dovrebbero svolgere loro stesse. Esse sono come le masse che non praticano lo sport di persona e per se stesse, perché ne sono incapaci per loro ignoranza, e per il raggiungimento davanti agli strumenti che mirano a divertirle e a stordirle affinché ridano e applaudano, invece di fare dello sport, che essi appunto monopolizzano. Come il potere deve essere delle masse, anche lo sport deve essere delle masse. Come la ricchezza deve essere di tutte le masse e le armi del popolo, anche lo sport, per la sua qualità di attività sociale, deve essere delle masse. Lo sport pubblico riguarda tutte le masse, ed è un diritto di tutto il popolo per i vantaggi che offre in salute ed in benessere. E’ stolto lasciare tali benefici ad individui e a gruppi particolari, che li monopolizzano e ne colgono individualmente i vantaggi igienici e spirituali, mentre le masse provvedono a tutte le facilitazioni e mezzi, pagando le spese per sostenere lo sport pubblico e quanto esso richiede. Le migliaia di spettatori che riempiono le gradinate degli stadi per applaudire e ridere sono migliaia stolti incapaci di praticare lo sport di persona: tanto che stanno allineati sui palchi dello stadio apatici e plaudenti a quegli eroi che hanno strappato loro l’iniziativa dominando il campo, e che si sono accaparrati lo sport requisendo tutti i mezzi prestati a loro vantaggio dalle stesse masse. Le gradinate degli stadi pubblici originariamente sono state allestite per frapporre un ostacolo tra le masse ed i campi e gli stadi: cioè per impedire alle masse di raggiungere i campi sportivi. Esse saranno disertate, e quindi soppresse, il giorno in cui le masse si faranno avanti e praticheranno lo sport collettivamente nel bel mezzo degli stadi e dei campi sportivi, rendendosi conto che lo sport è un’attività pubblica che bisogna praticare e non stare a guardare. Se mai potrebbe essere ragionevole il contrario: che a guardare fosse la minoranza impotente o inerte. Le gradinate degli stadi scompariranno quando non si troverà più chi vi si siede. La gente incapace di rappresentare i ruoli dell’eroismo nella vita, coloro che ignorano i fatti della storia, che sono limitati nella rappresentazione del futuro e che non sono seri nella vita sono degli individui marginali che riempiono i posti dei teatri e degli spettacoli per stare a guardare i fatti della vita e imparare come procede. Esattamente come gli allievi che riempiono i banchi delle scuole, perché non sono istruiti, anzi in partenza sono analfabeti. Coloro che si costruiscono la vita da sé, non hanno bisogno di guardare come va per mezzo di attori sul palcoscenico del teatro o nelle sale da spettacolo. Così i cavalieri, ciascuno dei quali monta il proprio cavallo, non hanno posto al margine dell’ippodromo. E se ognuno avesse un cavallo non si troverebbe chi assiste ed applaude alla corsa: gli spettatori seduti sono soltanto quelli incapaci di svolgere tale attività, perché non sono cavalieri. Così ai popoli beduini non importa il teatro e gli spettacoli, perché lavorano sodo e sono del tutto seri nella vita. Essi realizzano la vita seria, e perciò si burlano della recitazione. Le comunità beduine non stanno a guardare chi svolge una parte, ma praticano i divertimenti o i giochi in modo collettivo, perché ne sentono istintivamente il bisogno e li eseguono senza spiegazioni. I diversi tipi di pugilato e di lotta sono prova che l’umanità non si è ancora liberata da tutti i comportamenti selvaggi. Ma necessariamente finiranno, quando l’essere umano si sarà elevato più in alto sulla scala della civiltà. Il duello con le pistole e prima d’esso l’offerta del sacrificio umano erano un costume abituale in una delle fasi dell’evoluzione dell’umanità. Ma queste pratiche selvagge sono cessate da secoli, e l’uomo ha cominciato a ridere di se stesso e nel contempo a dolersi di aver compiuto tali atti. Così sarà anche per la questione dei diversi tipi di pugilato e di lotta fra decenni o fra secoli. Ma gli individui più civilizzati degli altri e mentalmente più elevati già fin d’ora possono fare qualcosa per tenersi lontano dal praticare e incoraggiare tale comportamento selvaggio.


Sport is either private, like the prayer which man performs alone by himself even inside a closed room, or public, practised collectively in open places, like the prayer which is practised collectively in places of worship. The first type of sport concerns the individual himself, while the second type is of concern to all people. It must be practised by all people and should not be left to anybody to practise on their behalf. It is unreasonable for crowds to enter places of worship just to view a person or a group of people praying without taking part. It is equally unreasonable for crowds to enter playgrounds and arenas to watch a player or a team without participating themselves. Sport is like praying, eating, and the feeling of warmth and coolness. It is stupid for crowds to enter a restaurant just to look at a person or a group of persons eating; it is stupid for people to let a person or a group of persons get warmed or enjoy ventilation on their behalf. It is equally illogical for the society to allow an individual or a team to monopolize sports while the people as a whole pay the costs of such a monopoly for the benefit of one person or a team. In the same way people should not democratically allow an individual or a group, whether party, class, sect, tribe or parliament, to replace them in deciding their destiny and in defining their needs. Private sport is of concern only to those who practise it on their own and at their own expense. Public sport is a public need and the people should not be represented in its practice either physically or democratically. Physically, the representative cannot transmit to others how his body and morale benefited from sport. Democratically, no individual or team has the right to monopolize sport, power, wealth or arms for themselves. Sporting clubs are the basic organizational means of traditional sport in the world today. They get hold of all expenditures and public facilities allocated to sport in every state. These institutions are only social monopolistic instruments like all dictatorial political instruments which monopolize authority, economic instruments which monopolize wealth, and traditional military instruments which monopolize arms. As the era of the masses does away with the instruments monopolizing power, wealth and arms, it will, inevitably, destroy the monopoly of social activity such as sports, horsemanship and so forth. The masses who queue to vote for a candidate to represent them in deciding their destiny act on the impossible assumption that he will represent them
and embody, on their behalf, their dignity, sovereignty and point of view. However those masses, who are robbed of their will and dignity, are reduced to mere spectators, watching another person performing what they should, naturally, be doing themselves. The same holds true of the crowds which fail to practise sport by themselves and for themselves because of their ignorance. They are fooled by monopolistic instruments which endeavour to stupefy them and divert them to indulging in laughter and applause instead. Sport, as a social activity, must be for the masses, just as power, wealth and arms should be in the hands of the people. Public sport is for all the masses. It is a right of all the people for its health and recreational benefits. It is mere stupidity to leave its benefits to certain individuals and teams who monopolize them while the masses provide the facilities and pay the expenses for the establishment of public sports. The thousands who crowd stadiums to view, applaud and laugh are those foolish people who have failed to carry out the activity themselves. They line
up on the shelves of the sports grounds, practising lethargy, and applauding those heroes who wrest from them the initiative, dominate the field and control the sport, exploiting the facilities the masses provide. Originally, the public grandstands were designed to demarcate the masses from the playing fields and grounds, i.e. to prevent the masses from having access to the playing fields. When the masses march and play sport in the centre of the playing fields and the open spaces, stadiums will be vacated and destroyed. That will take place when the masses become aware of the fact that sport is a public activity which must be practised rather than watched. The opposite, which would be a helpless apathetic minority that watch, would be more reasonable. The grandstand will disappear when no one is there to occupy it. Those who are unable to perform the roles of heroism in life, who are ignorant of the events of history, who fall short of envisaging the future and who are not serious enough in their lives, are the trivial persons who fill the seats of the theatres and cinemas to watch the events of life and to learn their course. They are like pupils who occupy school desks because they are not only uneducated but also illiterate. Those who direct the course of life for themselves do not need to watch it working through actors on the stage or in the cinemas. Likewise, horsemen who hold the reins of their horses have no seat in the grandstands at the race course. If every person has a horse, no one will be there to watch and applaud. The sitting spectators are only those who are too helpless to perform this kind of activity because they are not horsemen. Equally, the bedouin peoples show no interest in theatres and shows because they are very serious and hard working. As they have created a serious life, they ridicule acting. Bedouin societies also do not watch performers, but perform games and take part in joyful ceremonies because they naturally recognize the need for these activities and practise them automatically.
Different types of boxing and wrestling are evidence that mankind has not got rid of all savage behaviour. Inevitably they will come to an end when man ascends the ladder of civilization. Human sacrifice and pistol duels were familiar practices in different stages of human evolution. However, those savage practices came to an end years ago. Man now laughs at himself and regrets such acts. That will be the fate of boxing and wrestling after tens or hundreds of years. However, the more the people are civilized and sophisticated, the more they are able to ward off both the performance and the encouragement of these practices.


21 Ott


L’umanità continuerà ad essere arretrata finché rimarrà incapace di esprimersi in un’unica lingua. Finché l’uomo non realizzerà tale aspirazione – che sembra persino impossibile – l’espressione della gioia e del dolore, del bene e del male, del bello e del brutto, del riposo e dell’affanno, dell’annientamento e dell’eternità, dell’amore e dell’odio, dei colori, dei modi di sentire, dei gusti e del temperamento – l’espressione di tutte queste cose rimarrà nella stessa lingua che ogni popolo parla spontaneamente. Anzi, il comportamento stesso rimarrà conforme alla reazione derivante dal modo di sentire che la lingua crea nell’intelligenza di chi la parla. L’apprendimento di un’unica lingua, qualunque essa sia, non è però la soluzione possibile al giorno d’oggi. Questo problema continuerà a restare necessariamente irrisolto finché il processo di unificazione del linguaggio non passerà attraverso molte epoche e generazioni. E a condizione che il fattore ereditario, trasmesso dalle generazioni precedenti, venga a cessare in seguito al trascorrere di un tempo a ciò sufficiente, dato che il modo di sentire, il gusto e il carattere dei nonni e dei padri formano quello dei figli e dei nipoti. Se tali antenati si esprimevano in lingue diverse, e se i loro discendenti si esprimessero in un’unica lingua, quest’ultimi non avrebbero l’un l’altro gli stessi gusti, sia pure parlando la stessa lingua. Infatti tale unità di gusti si realizza solo dopo che la nuova lingua arriva ad elaborare gusti e modi di sentire che le generazioni si trasmettono per eredità dall’una all’altra. Se un gruppo di gente, in caso di lutto, veste di colore bianco ed un altro gruppo, nella stessa situazione, veste di nero, il modo di sentire di ciascun gruppo si plasmerà in ragione di questi due colori. Vale a dire che un gruppo finisce per detestare il nero, mentre all’altro esso piace, e viceversa. Tale modo di sentire lascia una traccia tangibile, sulle cellule e tutte le molecole e la loro dinamica nel corpo. Perciò questo adattamento del gusto si trasmetterà per eredità: l’erede odia automaticamente il colore odiato da chi glielo trasmette, perché ne eredita anche il modo di sentire. Così i popoli sono in armonia solo con le loro arti e il loro retaggio. Non possono esserlo con quelle degli altri a causa del fattore ereditario; neppure se, diversi per retaggio, dovessero trovarsi a parlare una stessa lingua. Anzi, questa differenza, sia pure in termini molto ridotti, compare persino fra i gruppi di uno stesso popolo. L’apprendimento di un’unica lingua di per sé non è un problema, e non lo è neppure la comprensione delle arti degli altri, dopo aver appreso la loro lingua. Il vero problema è l’impossibilità del reale adattamento interiore alla lingua degli altri. Cosa che rimarrà impossibile fino a quando non sia scomparsa la traccia ereditaria nel fisico dell’uomo, evolutosi a parlare la stessa lingua. In realtà il genere umano continuerà ad essere arretrato finché l’uomo non parlerà col suo fratello umano una stessa lingua, che sia trasmessa per eredità, e non appresa. Però il raggiungimento di tale meta da parte dell’umanità resta un problema di tempo, almeno finché la civiltà non abbia subito un totale rivolgimento.


Man is still backward because he is unable to speak one common language. Until he attains this human aspiration, which seems impossible, the expression of joy and sorrow, what is good and bad, beauty and ugliness, comfort and misery, mortality and eternity, love and hatred, the description of colours, sentiments, tastes and moods — all will be according to the language each people speaks automatically. Behaviour itself will remain based on the reaction produced by the feeling the language creates in the speaker’s mind. Learning one language, whatever it may be, is not the solution for the time being. It is a problem that will inevitably remain without solution until the process of the unification of languages has passed through various generations and epochs, provided that the hereditary factor comes to an end in those generations through the passage of enough time. For the sentiment, taste and mood of the forefathers and fathers form those of sons and grandsons. If those forefathers spoke various languages and the grandsons speak one language, the grandsons will not necessarily share a common taste by virtue of speaking one language. Such a common taste can only be achieved when the new language imparts the taste and the sense which are transmitted by inheritance from one generation to another. If a group of people wear white clothes in mourning and another group put on black ones, the sentiment of each group will be adjusted according to these two colours, i.e. one group hates the black colour while the other one likes it, and vice versa. Such a sentiment leaves its physical effect on the cells as well as on the genes in the body. This adaptation will be transmitted by inheritance. The inheritor automatically hates the colour hated by the legator as a result of inheriting the sentiment of his legator. Consequently, people are only harmonious with their own arts and heritages. They are not harmonious with the arts of others because of heredity, even though those people, who differ in heritage, speak one common language. Such a difference emerges between the groups of one people even if it is on a small scale. To learn one language is not a problem and to understand others’ arts as a result of learning their language is also not a problem. The problem is the impossibility of a real intuitional adaptation to the language of others. This will remain impossible until the effect of heredity, which is transmitted in the human body, comes to an end. Mankind is really still backward because man does not speak with his brother one common language which is inherited and not learned. However, it is only a matter of time for mankind to achieve that goal unless civilization should relapse.